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THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND PENSION
TRUSTS-AN OBSTACLE IN TAX PLANNING
One of the most noteworthy economic developments of the past
twenty years has been the tremendous growth of employee benefit
programs. Current estimates place reserves held to secure retirement
benefits at over 67 -billion dollars.' A variety of factors has contributed
to this imposing growth.2 Clearly of major if not paramount importance
are the tax benefits incident to the creation of a plan which qualifies
under the Internal Revenue Code. 3 An employer's contributions to a
qualified plan are deductible from gross income.4 Employees realize
taxable income only as benefits are actually received' and, in case of
lump sum distributions, capital gains treatment is accorded.6 Furthermore
a qualified trust is exempt from taxation.
7
Qualified plans 'are funded through reserves held in trust' or by
purchase of employee annuities.9 Choice of the trust device makes state
trust and property law an important consideration in pension planning.'
0
Draftsmen have, for example, been troubled with a possible application
of the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities to pension trusts."
Several state legislatures have responded by exempting pension trusts
from the operation of this and other rules of property law which are
hereinafter referred to collectively as the restrictive rules of property.
1 2
These include the Rule Against Perpetuities, the Rule Against the
Duration of Trusts, the Rule Against Accumulations, the Rule Against
Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, and the Rules Against
Restraints on the Power of Alienation.
The statutes passed in these jurisdictions do not, however, solve all
IThe TALLY OF LIFE INSURANCE STATISTICS, December, 1956, published by
the Institute of Life Insurance. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REVIEW 2:57, page 31
reports S.E.C. estimates that individual savings in form of pension reserves in-
creased at a rate of one billion dollars per quater 1956, first three quarters.
2Retirement and pension plans were held subject to mandatory collective
bargaining in Inland Steel Company v. N.L.R.B., 170 F.2d 247 (1948), cert. denied
336 U.S. 960 (1949). For an appraisal of the social forces behind the quest for
economic security in old age, see DEARING, INDUSTRIAL PENSIONS 1 (1954).
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §401 et seq.
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §404; 2 CCH FED. TAX REP. 12600.
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§402 and 403.
6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §402(a) (2).
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §501(a).
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §401.
9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §403.
10 Use of the trust device is customary. See CCH PENSION PLAN GuWE 12600.
11 See, e.g., CLARK, PROFIT SHARING AND PENSION PLANS §6 (1946); CCH
PENSION PLAN GUIDE 11105 et seq.; Lauritzen, Perpetuities and Pension Trusts,
24 TAXES 519 (1946).
12 See CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE f 11f"6 which reproduces all current legis-
lation.
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the problems which may be faced in this area by one who contemplates
funding a pension program in conjunction with the trust device. Indeed
thirteen states have no exempting legislation and not all of the states
which have enacted such statutes exempt pension trusts from all of the
rules enumerated above. Moreover, even if a pension trust is executed
in a jurisdiction which has enacted a comprehensive exempting statute,
the validity of the trust provisions, under the rules of conflict of laws,
may be determined by the law of another state.1"
The scope of this comment is limited to an examination of a possible
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to the pension trust though
brief reference to the other restrictive rules is included.
THE COMMON LAW RULE AGAINST PERPERUITIES
The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities is no doubt the most
familiar of the restrictive rules. John Chipman Gray's statement of the
Rule has been accepted as the standard.14
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of
the interest.' 5
There appears to be no reported case in which the Rule has been
applied to a pension trust' and only one commentator, Christian M.
Lauritzen, has ventured into the area of perpetuities and pension trusts
in any great detail.' 7 He presents a convincing argument, indorsed by
the American Law of Property,18 that the Rule should be confined
to the field of family trusts and not extended to invalidate pension
trusts. He does however suggest a possible violation of the Rule com-
mitted in the creation of a pension trust.
It would be theoretically possible for an employee to become
entitled to a retirement pension even though he was born more
than twenty-one years after the death of the last beneficiary
alive when the trust was created. Thus the interest of this
employee would vest at a date beyond the limit fixed by the
Rule ... J9
Lauritzen proceeds on the assumption that if the Rule were applied
13VI AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.5A (Casner ed. 1952); Lauritzen,
supra note 11, 5234.
14 VI AMEICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.1 (Casner ed. 1952).
15 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §201 (1915).
16 See however CLARK, op. cit. supra note 11, 24 n. 6. The author sets forth
a B.T.A. Memo. Op. which considered a perpetuities question incident to the
creation of a pension trust.
17 Lauritzen, supra note 11.
18VI AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.61 (Casner ed. 1952).
19 Lauritzen, supra note 11 at 520. See also SIMES AND SMITH, LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS §1247 (1956) ; "It would seem that, since these trusts are for the benefit
of present and future employees, there may be included as beneficiaries unborn or
unascertained persons who will become employees in the future, and whose equi-
table interests may not vest within the period of the rule against perpetuities".
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to a pension trust, it would be applied as though the trust served as a
vehicle for a class gift. Thus, under the rule of Leake v. Robinson," the
consequence of the violation is that the entire gift fails since the interest
of a potential member of the class may vest remotely. The class gift
analysis raises further difficulties. A savings clause inserted in the trust
instrument calling for termination of the trust twenty-one years after
the death of the survivor of those beneficiaries in being at the creation
of the trust would be of questionable effect.2 If the number of measur-
ing lives assumes major proportions the clause may be ignored and the
trust held void for uncertainty.22 The tax consequence of such a holding
is a matter for conjecture.23
But it is questionable whether an employer's contribution to a
pension trust should be placed in the category of limitations traditionally
designated as class gifts. It is no doubt true that the -beneficiaries have
in common their employment2 4 and that the employer in making con-
tributions is "group minded."125 The retirement of disability benefits
paid to the beneficiary of a pension trust do not, however, depend for
their amount on the ultimate number of employees who are covered
under the plan. 26 Per capita gifts to the members of a class have always
been exempt from the rigor of the rule of Leake v. Robinson. Indeed
20 2 Mer. 363. See also Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts To
Classes, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1938), where the rule is severely criticized.
21 Such clauses are used often in pension trusts in an attempt to avoid
violation of the Rule. SIMES AND SMiTH, op. cit. supra note 19, §1247.
22 Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638, 642 (1938). The
author cites a case in which the measuring lives (120) were "all the lineal de-
scendants of Queen Victoria now living." In re Villar, (1929) 1 Ch. 243, "The
gift was held valid but it certainly represents the outside limit of the permissible
number of lives."2 3 Lauritzen, supra note 11, 519, suggests that contributions made to such
void trusts would have to be disallowed as deductions from gross income, resulting
in higher corporate income for the years in question. INT. Rav. CODE oF 1954
§401(a) (2) states as a requirement for qualification that it must be impossible,
at any time prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to employees and
their beneficiaries, for any part of the corpus or income to be diverted to purs-
poses other than the exclusive benefit of employees or their beneficiaries. It might
be argued, if the trust were declared void, that the corpus, since it represents.
compensation for services actually rendered, is held on a resulting trust for the
employees and that a transfer immediately thereafter to an express trust, identical
in provision to the former pension trust except for the violative provision, con-
stitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of §401.
24 GRAY, op. cit. supra note 15, §369 n. 1.
25 SIMES AND SMirm, op. cit. supra note 19, §612. Protection of this group
interest could serve as additional justification for not applying the Rule.
26 Under the generally accepted definitions of Jarman and Gray the share of
each person of the alleged class must be dependant for its amount on the ultimate
membership of the class. JARMAN, WILLS 310 (7th ed. 1930); GRAY, op. cit. supra
note 24. Otherwise the gift is per capita.
Professors Simes and Smith do not agree that the size of each beneficiary's
share must depend upon the ultimate membership of the group before it is possible
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"it may be said that a per capita gift is not a class gift for the purposes
of the rule against perpetuities."
' 7
Since there seems to be little basis for analyzing the pension trust
in terms of class-gift concepts, those contributions which vest in interest
within the period of the -Rule would be saved even if it were deemed
initially applicable.2"
By far the more important question concerns this initial applicability.
Lauritzen offers two approaches to a solution which avoids the operation
of the Rule. First he finds an original purpose for the Rule and con-
cludes that:
As a device to restrain the dynastic impulses of great land
owners, the Rule against Perpetuities was a necessary and
desirable development of the common law. Its application.
however, should be confined to the field of family trusts, and
the Rule should not-be extended beyond its original purpose to
invalidate pension trusts designed to provide a decent old age
for the faithful employees of modern industry.29
Lauritzen's approach is sound though his point might be strengthened
through a minor change in form. The original purpose of the Rule is
not necessarily decisive in defining the desirable limits to its operation.
A more plausible criterion is available in the present day need and justi-
fication for a rule which invalidates reomtely vesting interests. Unfor-
tunately this yardstick is elusive.
Various commentators have suggested that the Rule finds its current
justification in the restraint which it imposes on the creation of family
dynasties, as a means in furtherance of the free alienability of property,"0
and as insurance that persons less fit in the social struggle will not be
assured incomes by the creation of obnoxious future interests."' The
Restatement concludes:
From this review of diverse purposes served by the rule against
perpetuities, it is fair to conclude that the social interest in
preserving property from excessive fettering rests partly upon
the necessities of maintaining a going society controlled pri-
marily by its living members, partly upon the social desirability
to have a class gift. SINIEs AND SMrTH, op. cit, supra note 19 at §615. They do.
however, deny the utility of a rigid criterion which purports to separate per capita
from class limitations without regard to context. As the class gift is a product of
the family settlement involving gifts to children, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters,
and the like, it is possible that the authors' analysis would lead to the conclusion
that a group of participants in an employee benefit program is outside the scope
of the designation.
27 SINIES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 19, §1266.
2 SIbid. See also CLARK, PROFIT SHARING AND PENSION PLANS §6 (1946). This
holding would substantially mitigate the drastic tax consequences to the employer
foreseen by Lauritzen; see supra note 23.
29 Lauritzen, supra note 11.
30 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §268 (4th ed. 1942).
31 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY p. 2132.
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of facilitating the utilization of wealth, partly upon the social
desirability of keeping property responsive to the current exig-
encies of its current beneficial owners, and partly upon the
competitive basis of modern society
32
Professor Lewis M. Simes in his contribution to the Thomas M.
Cooley Lectures, Public Policy and the Dead Hand, presents a cogent
analysis of the social interest served by the Rule. 'He suggests that undue
concentration of wealth is an evil which can best be combatted by tax
legislation, rather than perpetuity rules. Furthermore, the Rule is con-
cerned primarily with equitable interests in trust where usually liberal
powers of sale and investment in trustees insure that the corpus is not
taken wholly out of commerce. 3 As to the justification aimed at
preserving a natural balance in the social struggle, Simes succintly points
out that if such is the object of the Rule it simply does not accomplish
its. purpose. "Modern society with its elaborate welfare machinery, is
not organized on a theory of survival of the fittest." Simes finds a need
for the Rule in the natural balance it maintains between desires of
present generations to control the wealth of the world and the respect
to be accorded the dead hand. In other words the Rule provides com-
promise and coexistance for two socially desirable policies: a power of
testation (including its inter vivos equivalent) and control of society's
wealth by its living members.
Pension trusts occasion no comparable policy considerations. If a
funded pension trust is actuarially sound, its corpus at any given point
in time represents wealth attributable to the labor of current employee
participants which will furnish retirement benefits for use during their
lifetimes. An employer's contribution to the trust in 1958"is not intended
to secure the retirement of an employee who might be hired in the
year 2000. Indeed it is difficult to isolate a contingent interest arising
out of a qualified trust which could be attributed to unborn or unascer-
tained employees. Contributions by an employer are deductible under
I.R.C. §104 only to the extent that they represent compensation for
personal services actually rendered.34 Further, that amount of the corpus
of a trust which is in excess of the amount necessary to carry out the
purposes of the trust is traditionally viewed as held by the trustee on a
resulting trust for the settlor.35 Unanticipated appreciation of corpus
assets and contributions which exceed the statutory criterion should fall
3 2 Ibid.
33 It is true, however, as the author points out, that the corpus is taken out
of commerce to the extent that it cannot be used as a source of venture capital or
for the purchase of consumer's goods. See also RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, p. 2130:
"As to intangibles this socially desirable consequence of the rule is not so clear,
since shares and bonds constitute an important bulk of intangibles, and as to
intangibles of these types, restrictions operative as to shares or bonds would in
no way hamper the ultilization of its assets by the issuing corporation."
34 CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE ff2602.
35 See, e.g., BoGERT, TRUSTS §76 (3d ed. 1952).
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in this category to the extent that they are not taken into account by the
actuary in computing the employer's subsequent contributions.
If a violation of the rule were to be hypothesized, it would seem
necessary to equate the trust provision extending coverage to subsequent
employees to a special power of appointment (exercised each time an
employee is hired) which could be exercised remotely and to view the
corporate settlor as retaining a power to augment corpus." Conceding
this equation the rule is literally applicable but the necessary exercise of
the power to augment each time the power to appoint is exercised is so
similar to the creation of an entirely new trust that the existence of
these powers can hardly be said to run afoul of any of the purposes
which have been attributed to the rule.
So, too, in many respects the pension trust is similar to the common
trust fund, a method of putting into one fund the moneys of many
trusts, for the general purpose of obtaining greater stability of income
and principal values through diversity of investment, and also for
reducing the cost of trust administration. 7 In fact it is difficult to
distinguish substantively the common trust fund from a wholly con-
tributory pension trust. The presence of employers' contributions does
not detract from this strong collection-of-individual-trusts characteristic.
An employer's contributions to a pension trust constitute deferred com-
pensation to his employees" and pension benefits like wages are subject
to collective bargaining." Why not then view the employer merely as
an agency for transmittal of his employees' contributions to a common
trust fund? Looked at in this light, provision in the trust instrument
availing subsequent employees of the trust facilities raises no perpetuities
problem.
A second approach advanced by Lauritzen which avoids the operation
of the rule likens the pension trust to the charitable trust."0 While there
appears to be some slight justification in case law that pension trusts
are charitable, 41 this analogy has not escaped sound criticism." Further-
36 VI AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.32 (Casner ed. 1952).
37 AMERICAN BANKER'S ASSOcIATIoN, COMMON TRUST FUNDS 9 (2d ed. 1948).
The Association has adopted the following definition: "The term common trust
fund means a fund established by a corporate trust institution, in which is com-
bined for the purpose of facilitating investment, money belonging to various trust
accounts in its care, the participating contributory interests of said accounts being
appropriately evidenced." Id. at 10.
38 See CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE 12602. "Contributions deductible under
section 404, as in the 1939 Code, may be deducted only to the extent that they are
necessary business expenses and are compensation for personal services actually
rendered."
39 See supra note 2.
40 Lauritzen, supra note 11, 528.
41Ibid. 530, 531.
42 SIIES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 19, §1247. The authors do add: "It
does seem highly desirable, however, not to apply the rule against perpetuities to
them. For it is very unsatisfactory to fix an arbitrary date for termination of the
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more, strong arguments have been advanced for subjecting the charitable
trust to rules limiting its duration and regulating its provision for the
accumulation of income.43 The bases of these contentions 'do not neces-
sarily extend to the pension trust; and until the status of the charitable
trust is clarified, it would seem preferable to maintain a sperate identity
for the pension trust.
The search for an analogous property device suggests very strongly
that pension trusts are sut geners. They bear little more resemblance
to the private express trust than Social Security does to the family settle-
ment. As a receptacle for reserves which secure retirement ,benefits, the
trust serves a novel function--one for which it is well suited wcqth regard
to administrative convenience. This new use, alien to the family settle-
ment, together with the imposing growth of the institution, suggests that
considerable restraint should be exercised in the application of law which
was designed to accommodate private arrangements. Provisions for exten-
sion of coverage to subsequent employees in "master policies" under
which employee annuities are issued raises no apparent perpetuities prob-
lem. There is no reason why similar pension trust provisions should invite
operation of the Rule. The Rule, while applied strictly, should be applied
to substance and not form.4
4
OTHER RESTRICTIVE RULES
Most of the other restrictive rules pose no real problem in drafting
a 'qualified pension trust. It is difficult to conceive of a practical direction
to accumulate income which would violate any orthodox rule against
accumulations.45 It would seem too that the absolute power of alienation
over the corpus is never suspended.4" Furthermore it is generally agreed
trust at a time twenty-one years aftei the death of a group of persons entirely
unconnected with the business of the corporation. It may well be that the social
policy in favor of such trusts is so strong that they should be held to be exempt
even though they are not charitable trusts".
43 COMMITTEE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO CHARITABLE TRUSTS,
REPORT CMD. No. 8710 (1952). See also SIMES AND SMITH, op. cit. supra note 19,§1467.
44 VI AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.9 (Casner ed. 1952).
45Assuming a potentially violative provision, strong arguments could be
advanced for excepting the pension trust from the most rigorous statutes. The
first line of defense against obnoxious accumulations is the income tax. Yet
pensions trusts, like charitable trusts (which are generally exempted from rules
restricting accumulations) are exempt from taxation. See supra note 7. Further-
more, the practical solution to dangerous accumulations is a limitation on the
maximum reserves which can be built up to secure benefits. The Code and
Regulations accomplish this to the extent that deductions must be intended for
deferred compensation, meet the ordinary and necessary business expenses test
and be reasonable compensation for services actually rendered. CCH PENSION
PLAN GUIDE 12601 et seq.
46 The absolute power of alienation is said to be suspended by the creation
of future interests in unborn persons so that it is impossible for persons in being
to join in the conveyance of a fee simple absolute. The rule prohibiting absolute
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that the common law imposes no general restrictions on the duration of
trusts47 although one commentator predicts the emergence of a rule
avoiding provisions which prohibit the beneficiaries from terminating the
trust if the provision is applicable beyond the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities.'
s
The variety of rules against restraints on the power of alienation
do, however, merit close attention. None is more firmly entrenched than
the rule that a settlor cannot create a spendthrift trust for his own
benefit, thereby putting the income and corpus beyond the reach of his
creditors.4 9 Provisions which forbid an employee to anticipate his interest
in a pension trust are not rare.50 Under such a provision, an employee,
to the extent of his own contributions, has apparently come within the
ban of the rule. Yet creditors have experienced little success in attempting
to satisfy their claims out of an employee's contributions subject to a
spendthrift restraint. One case gives reason to believe that the courts will
develop a vague public policy exception for employees' contributions
and ignore the spendthrift trust analogy. 5 It would seem that this
judicial attitude merits scrutiny by creditors' representatives. If 67
billion dollars of the nation's wealth were to be tied up in deferred
compensation free from valid claims of creditors, (and there is every
indication that coverage will increase) 52 liberal credit policy may stand
reviewing. Furthermore, stronger forces could press for state exempting
legislation than was mobilized to obtain exemptions for many private
annuities. 3
suspension is not coextensive in application with the rule against perpetuities.
E.g., to the church so long as used for church purposes, then to B (a living person).
B's executory interest is subject to the rule but the absolute power of alienation is
not suspended since the church and B can join presently to convey an absolute fee.
Similarly it would seem that the employer and his present labor force could at all
times join in the termination of a pension trust and cause a complete disposition
of the corpus.
471 Scorr ON TRUSTS §62.10 (2d ed. 1956).
48 SINIES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS §1465 (1956) ; see also
I ScoTT ON TRUSTS §62.10 (2d ed. 1956).
49 GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §557 (2d ed. 1947) II ScoTr ON TRUSTS
§156 (2d ed. 1956) ; 1A BOGART, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §224 (1951).
50 CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE 11118; A spendthrift restraint on the rights
of employees under a pension plan does not disqualify the plan under the Internal
Revenue Code. Rev. Rul. 56432.
m In re Baxter, 104 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1939). Cf. TVA v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d
833 (1944). GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §112.1, §577 (2d ed. 1947).
152 Note, e.g., the currently pending Jenkins-Keough Bill, H.R. 9, 85th Con-
gress, 1st Session, "Self-Employed Individuals' Retirement Act of 1957," which
would extend tax benefits now enjoyed by participants in qualified plans to the
self-employed through restricted retirement funds and non-assignable annuities.
53 See GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §114.1. "Such payments are closely
analogous to the situation where a person attempts to create a spendthrift trust
for his own benefit. . . . [O]f course the answer is that people who take out in-
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CONCLUSION
As the use of the trust device in pension funding rises, it becomes
apparent that there is no convenient niche in the law of private arrange-
ments in which to place it. Applying the restrictive rules of property to
the pension trust illustrates an analytical problem with several facets.
A tremendous wealth has suddenly been subjected to prudent man and
legal list rules of investment, placing a conceivable strain on sources of
venture capital and investment outlet. 4 The fiduciary relationship has
been abused at shocking levels. 5 There have even been warnings that
conservative vesting policies threaten the mobility of the nation's labor
force.5 6 Perhaps most intriguing are the predictions that we stand on the
threshold of an era of devolution of wealth on a group basis in which a
man's estate will be planned for him on his employer's IBM machine."7
William W. Wer
surance policies have a legislative spokesman in the insurance companies, while
people who want to create spendthrift trusts for their own benefit do not."
54 See, e.g., DEARING, INDUSTRIAL PENSIONS 176 et seq.
55See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF SUBCOMMITrEE ON WELFARE AND PENSION
FUNDS. S. Rep. No. 1734, 84 Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
56NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION STAFF REPORT, SPECIAL REPORT N% 44
(1956).
57 Lynn, Legal and Economic Implications of the Emergence of Quasi-Public
Wealth, 65 YALE L.J. 786 (1956).
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